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Abstract
The dynamics in a ﬁnancial market with heterogeneous agents is analyzed under dif-
ferent market architectures. We start with a tractable behavioral model under Walrasian
market clearing and simulate it under more realistic trading protocols. The key behav-
ioral feature of the model is the switching of agents between simple forecasting rules on
the basis of ﬁtness measure. Analyzing the dynamics under order-driven protocols we
show that behavioral and structural assumptions of the model are closely intertwined.
High responsiveness of agents to a ﬁtness measure causes excess volatility, however the
frictions of the order-driven markets may stabilize the dynamics. We also analyze and
compare allocative eﬃciency and time series properties under diﬀerent protocols.
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21 Introduction
Models of ﬁnancial markets often assume the simplistic mechanism for a market clearing: the
Walrasian scenario. This observation applies also to an innovative research area of heteroge-
neous agent models, in which the heterogeneity in expectations of traders is a key to explain
the properties of markets. In reality, however, markets are functioning in a diﬀerent way.
Agents are allowed to transmit only ﬁnite amount of information in form of the orders to buy
or sell. Furthermore, many markets employ continuous trade in the form of sequential orders.
In this paper we study the impact of the market organization on dynamical properties of
the asset pricing model populated by adaptive, boundedly rational agents with heterogeneous
forecasting rules. We demonstrate that the adaptive abilities of the agents can be impaired
by frictions inherent in the order-driven mechanisms. Surprisingly, the price dynamics can be
stabilized via this channel. We also analyze how the market eﬃciency and statistical properties
of prices are aﬀected by this interplay of behavioral and institutional assumptions.
Statistical properties of real ﬁnancial data have been thoroughly investigated in the past,
see e.g. Fama (1970), Pagan (1996), Brock (1997) and Cont (2002). This line of research
established a number of regularities in ﬁnancial data, so-called “stylized facts”, many of which
are observed universally in all time periods and on diﬀerent stock exchanges. Some of these
regularities, e.g. absence of signiﬁcant autocorrelations in price returns, are well in agreement
with the prevailing theory called the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis which suggests that the
markets are informationally eﬃcient with asset prices immediately reﬂected a new information.
At the same time, such regularities as large and persistent trading volume, signiﬁcant positive
autocorrelations in variance of returns (volatility clustering), heavier than normal tails of the
return distribution are left unexplained within the classical paradigm. A seminal paper of
Shiller (1981) detected that asset prices are more volatile than underlying fundamentals. The
discovered excess volatility undermined a completeness of the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis.
Explaining these empirical properties by means of a simple theoretical model is an im-
portant but not a simple task and there are diﬀerent directions to deviate from the classical
paradigm with rational, representative agent (see e.g. Lucas, 1978) in a hope to accomplish
3this goal. One way is to acknowledge that rationality assumption is too demanding in a com-
plex environment of ﬁnancial markets. Models with heterogeneous agents using some bounded
rational procedure as proposed in Sargent (1993) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) can be
more appropriate. A number of agent-based simulations of markets and more rigorous analyt-
ical “Heterogeneous Agent Models” (HAMs) have been developed, where agents with diﬀerent
expectations may coexist in one market.1 If one group of agents, fundamentalists, believe that
price typically reﬂects a fundamental value, while another group, chartists, extrapolate price
trends, then the prices in a market can deviate from the fundamental value when chartists are
in a majority. In Brock and Hommes (1998) this simple story is augmented by the evolutionary
dynamics of relative fractions of fundamentalists and chartists. In such “Adaptive Belief Sys-
tem” agents not only update their forecasts as new data become available, but also switch from
one forecasting technique to another depending on their past performances. Gaunersdorfer et
al. (2008) show that even a simple version of such adaptive model can generate dynamics with
some realistic properties. Since extrapolative expectations of chartists can be self-conﬁrming,
prices can deviate from the fundamental level even in the absence of considerable fundamen-
tal news. Thus, dynamics exhibit an excess volatility. Furthermore, for certain parameter
values the underlying deterministic system possesses two attractors, the fundamental steady
state and a cycle around it, with small volatility on the former and high volatility on the
latter. When dynamic noise is added to the system, price trajectory can interchangeably visit
basins of these two attractors generating volatility clustering. Gaunersdorfer and Hommes
(2007) show that with suﬃciently large level of noise this model indeed generates a dynamics
qualitatively similar with real markets.
Alternatively, one can focus on the market design as a possible origin of stylized facts.
1Santa Fe artiﬁcial market introduced in Arthur et al. (1997) and the model of microscopic simulations
in Levy et al. (2000) are two known examples of computational approach focused on bounded rationality in
expectation formation. They are accompanied by parsimonious models in Day and Huang (1990), Lux (1995),
Brock and Hommes (1998), Farmer and Joshi (2002), Diks and van der Weide (2005), Anufriev et al. (2006) and
Anufriev and Dindo (2007). See LeBaron (2006) and Hommes (2006) for recent reviews focused, respectively,
on computational and analytical models with heterogeneous agents.
4Most of the classical models (with notable exceptions in Kyle, 1985 and Glosten and Milgrom,
1985) and all the HAMs quoted above use the Walrasian market clearing. It may be the case,
however, that speciﬁc design features of the real markets bring some structure into the data.
LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2003) show that an artiﬁcial market with realistic architecture, namely
an order-driven market under electronic book protocol, is capable of generating satisfactory
statistical properties of price series (e.g. leptokurtosis of the returns distribution) even with
minimal behavioral assumptions. Furthermore, simulations in Bak et al. (1997) and Maslov
(2000) suggest that desirable distributional properties can arise in the order-driven market
even in the absence of any behavioral assumptions on the side of the agents.
These two approaches disentangle behavioral and structural assumptions and, therefore,
may provide only partial explanation of statistical regularities of ﬁnancial markets. As op-
posed to those studies, recent agent-based models in Chiarella and Iori (2002), LeBaron and
Yamamoto (2006) and Chiarella et al. (2007) incorporate the agents’ heterogeneity in the
order-driven markets. But an interplay between behavioral and structural assumptions is far
from trivial in these models, so that they suﬀer from the “curse of complexity”, when it be-
comes virtually impossible to understand how the two sets of assumptions contribute to the
models’ results. Consequently, our approach in this paper will be to start with a parsimonious
model, which is analytically tractable under the Walrasian market clearing, and then increase
the complexity by adding more realistic, order-driven trading protocols. The latter versions
of the model is investigated through computer simulations.
Our research strategy is largely inspired by the work of Bottazzi et al. (2005). Motivated by
an empirical evidence from the world’s stock exchanges that market micro-structure does inﬂu-
ence statistical properties of returns, they compare dynamics under diﬀerent trading protocols
when two types of traders, chartists and noise traders, act in a market in ﬁxed proportions.
Bottazzi et al. (2005) conclude that market architecture plays larger role in shaping the time
series properties than behavioral aspects of the model. The authors also analyze the allocative
eﬃciency of the market and show that, as opposed to the time series properties, it depends
mainly on the traders’ behavior.
5This paper is focused on the similar questions. We start, however, with a model built in the
Adaptive Belief System of Brock and Hommes (1998). Thus, populational ecology consists of
fundamentalists and trend-followers whose proportions are evolving on the basis of diﬀerence
in past proﬁts. A key behavioral parameter of the model is the intensity of choice, measuring
the sensitivity of agents to this diﬀerence. If the market clears in the Walrasian way and the
number of agents approach inﬁnity, the model is approximated by the deterministic model
similar to the one analyzed in Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008). With our choice of forecasting
rules, there exist two regimes in the market, tranquil and volatile. When the intensity of
choice is low, i.e. smaller than a certain critical value, there is no excess volatility and prices
tranquilly stay on the fundamental level in the absence of the dividend payments. When the
intensity of choice is high, i.e. larger than this critical value, the volatile regime occurs with
persistent deviations of prices from the fundamental level and excess volatility is observed.
Our simulations reveal that similar two regimes are displayed also under two order-driven
trading protocols, i.e. the batch auction and the order book. Interestingly, the critical value of
the intensity of choice is higher in the order-driven markets, implying larger region of market
tranquility. Given a noisy nature of the order-driven trade, it is surprising, but it can be well
explained by the interplay of our behavioral assumptions and the market design. We also
compare the properties of market dynamics over diﬀerent market mechanisms, and show, in
particular, that an order-driven trade brings volatility clustering to the model.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we brieﬂy describe diﬀerent market
mechanisms and introduce behavioral part of our model. In Section 3 we analyze the model for
a simple case of Walrasian market with large number of agents and explain how two diﬀerent
market regimes arise. We then proceed by introducing the details of our implementation of
diﬀerent market mechanisms in Section 4. Results of simulations are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 provides some ﬁnal remarks.
62 The Model
We consider a standard asset-pricing model with two assets. The num´ eraire of the economy
is the elastically supplied riskless asset which yields constant gross return R = 1 + r per
period. The risky asset pays a random dividend yt in the beginning of period t. Realizations
of dividend are independently drawn from some distribution with positive support and mean
¯ y. The fundamental price of the risky asset is deﬁned as a discounted value of the expected
dividends and equal to pf = ¯ y/r. The risky asset is traded in the market, and its actual price
dynamics is inﬂuenced both by evolution in the demand/supply of traders and by the precise
mechanism for price determination. The following three trading protocols will be compared.
Under Walrasian market-clearing (WA), agents submit complete demand and supply sched-
ules, and the price of the risky asset pt in period t is deﬁned as an intersection of a sum of the
individual demand curves with a sum of the individual supply curves. In a market organized
as a batch auction (BA) agents simultaneously post the buy or sell orders 2. Cumulative de-
mand and supply curves are then derived, and the price of the risky asset pt is an intersection
of these curves. In the third market type the agents submit orders sequentially during the
trading session, and the matching is accommodated by an electronic order book (OB) which
stores unsatisﬁed orders. If submitted order ﬁnds a matching order of the opposite type in
the book, it is satisﬁed (completely or partially). An unsatisﬁed part of the order is stored in
the book. In such a market there is no unique price during period t, and notation pt is used
to denote the closing price in this market, i.e. the price of the last transaction.
These three mechanisms are interesting because they range from the settings preferred in
theoretical literature to the protocols used in real markets. Moreover, they diﬀer in a number
of dimensions, such as information required from the traders to be submitted and timing of
order submission. Indeed, the WA is a standard theoretical tool to model the market clearing
process. However, it requires an inﬁnite information from the agents, and therefore is not
implementable in practice 3. Architecture of the BA overcomes this problem, as agents have
2This mechanism is sometimes referred to as a call auction or a sealed-bid auction in the literature.
3The English clock auction with inter-period bids can provide a close approximation to the WA.
7to submit only ﬁnite number of orders. It is used in a number of exchanges, typically to deﬁne
a starting price of a trading session. Nowadays, however, most of the exchanges are using the
OB mechanism as more eﬃcient for continuous trading.
For comparison, the agents’ behavior will be modeled in a similar way under these three
institutional market settings. We populate the market by N myopic expected utility maxi-
mizers whose demand functions depend on expectations of next period price. The demands
of agents are not homogeneous because there are two rules to form the expectations. Fun-
damentalists compute the fundamental value and expect that the price will move towards it.
Trend-followers are less sophisticated, they simply extrapolate the past price changes. Rela-
tive fractions of fundamentalists and trend-followers aﬀect, of course, the price determination
in a given trading session. These fractions, in turn, are changing between trading sessions
and depend on the relative past performances of the two groups using diﬀerent rules. As a
performance measure we take an average return earned by fundamentalists (trend-followers)
during the last trading session.
In the remaining of this Section we explain how the demand of agents is deﬁned and then
introduce the evolutionary dynamics in the model.
2.1 Agents demand
Agents are risk-averse expected utility maximizers with common risk aversion coeﬃcient a.
Let Ai,t and Bi,t denote, respectively, the number of the risky and the riskless asset possessed
by agent i at time t. In order to obtain the optimal portfolio composition, agent i maximizes
at time t the conditional expectation of negative exponential utility of next period wealth
Wi,t+1. The wealth is uncertain both because the market price of the risky asset may change











+ Bi,t(1 + r),
Wi,t = Ai,t p + Bi,t .
(2)
The notation Ei,t in (1) stresses the fact that the expectation is conditional on the information
available at the beginning of time t and that the expectation is agent-speciﬁc. From the
constraints (2) the wealth evolution is derived
Wi,t+1 = Wi,t(1 + r) + Ai,t
 
pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)p

.
Assuming conditional normality of the wealth at time t + 1, the above optimization problem












i,t Vi,t[pt+1 + yt+1]
o
,
where Vi,t[pt+1 + yt+1] stands for the conditional expectations of trader i about the variance
of price cum dividend at time t + 1. The ﬁrst-order condition gives the standard demand
function for the risky asset
Ai,t(p) =
Ei,t[pt+1 + yt+1] − (1 + r)p
aVi,t[pt+1 + yt+1]
. (3)
As in Brock and Hommes (1998) we assume that traders have homogeneous and time-invariant
expectations about conditional variance Vi,t[pt+1 + yt+1] = σ2 and share correct expectations
about dividend Ei,t[yt] = ¯ y. It simpliﬁes the model and allows us to concentrate on the
heterogeneity in expectations of traders.
At any trading session every trader chooses one of two possible forecasting rules, reﬂecting




f + v (pt−1 − p
f), v ∈ [0,1], (4)
predicts that any price deviation from the fundamental level will be corrected. In one limiting
case, v = 0, immediate correction is expected, while in another limiting case, v = 1, agents




t[pt+1] = pt−1 + g (pt−1 − pt−2), g > 0, (5)
9predicts that past trend in price will be kept, so it is extrapolated with coeﬃcient g from past
price level.
Notice that the former rule (as opposed to the latter) requires a knowledge of fundamental
value. Consequently, we assume that to use the fundamental rule the agent has to pay cost
C > 0 per period, while the second rule is available for free.
2.2 Evolutionary updating of expectations
At the end of every trading round agents update their forecasting strategy, i.e. choose which
of the two rules, (4) or (5), will be used during the next session. The choice of the active
forecasting rule is based upon the commonly available deterministic part reﬂecting the past
performances of two rules. In addition, this measure is disturbed by the stochastic error
component reﬂecting the measurement error or imperfect computations of agents. The choice
process is modeled as follows.
In the end of trading round t, ﬁrst, an individual realized excess proﬁt is computed as a




pt + yt − (1 + r)pt−1

. (6)
Notice that in the case of continuous trading the excess return is evaluated on the basis of
closing prices. We stress also that under order-driven protocols, realized position of agent
Ai,t−1 can diﬀer from agents’ demand Ai,t−1(pt−1) due to possible rationing and/or diﬀerence
between quoted and transacted prices. More details will be provided later, when we discuss
the market protocols.
Having computed individual proﬁts, the performances of fundamental and trend-following
forecasting rules, U1
t and U2
t , are deﬁned as average proﬁt earned by all the fundamentalists
and all the trend-followers, respectively. From (6) it is clear that performance of the rule is
an average position of the followers of this rule times the excess return. Thus, if the risky
asset has earned positive (negative) return, then performance of the group with larger average
possession of the asset is bigger (smaller).










where C is the cost of fundamental predictor, and ξi,t and ζi,t are independent over time and
among the agents random variables. The choice can be rewritten in terms of probabilities for
the special case of a Gumbel distribution of error terms. In this case individual i chooses the




















t+1 = 1 − n
1
t+1 , (8)
with subscript indicating that these probabilities shape the population trading at period t+1.
Parameter β ≥ 0 is the intensity of choice measuring how sensitive agents are with respect to
the diﬀerence in past performances of two strategies. If the intensity of choice is inﬁnite, the
traders always switch to the historically most successful strategy. On the opposite extreme,
β = 0, agents are equally distributed between diﬀerent types independent of the past perfor-
mance. The intensity of choice β is inversely related to the variance of the noise terms ξi,t and
ζi,t.
The timing of our model is as follows. At the end of period t the average proﬁt earned by
fundamentalists from their holdings between periods t−1 and t is computed and learned by all
the traders. Analogously, the average proﬁt of trend-followers is learned. On the basis of these
two performances, at the beginning of period t agents independently choose their new types ac-
cording to the probabilities deﬁned in (8). To make this procedure feasible, in our simulations,
we always assure that every forecasting type has at least one representative at any trading
round. If an independent random draw did not produce any fundamentalist/trend-follower, we
simply repeat the procedure until the population contain at least one fundamentalist/trend-
follower.
4Our speciﬁcation of the error terms are common in the literature on the random utility models, see
Anderson et al. (1992). Implied probabilities are used to model a choice in a number of theoretical models
with diﬀerent range of application, see e.g. Brock (1993), Brock and Hommes (1997), Camerer and Ho (1999)
and Weisbuch et al. (2000).
11At the same time the demand functions for every type is computed on the basis of past
prices by plugging the expectation rules (4) and (5) into the demand equation (3). Now, when
the types are determined and demands are computed, the excess demand for every agent can
be found and trading session t + 1 starts. Then, under the BA and the OB, which are the
order-driven protocols, every agent is allowed to submit only one order per period, which is
a point from the excess demand curve.5 Furthermore, in the OB market, where intra-session
trade is sequential, the sequence in which agents enter the market is relevant for the outcome
of trade. To control for this eﬀect, we assume that in each period agents enter the market in
a random order, independently distributed over the time. To the end of the trading session
agents have ﬁxed their proﬁts for the holdings between periods t and t + 1, and have their
portfolio updated. The price pt+1 is deﬁned according to the trading mechanism.
3 Walrasian Market Clearing and Large Market Limit
Let us ﬁrst discuss the implications on the price dynamics of our behavioral assumptions of
the heterogeneity in expectations and agents’ adaptivity. For this purpose we consider the
simplest way of clearing market, assuming that at every period it is in temporary Walrasian
equilibrium with demand equal to supply.
Thus out ﬁrst mechanism, Walrasian protocol (WA), assumes that at time t every agent
submits the excess demand function ∆Ai,t(p), which is the diﬀerence between demand Ai,t
deﬁned in (3) and the current position of the investor in the risky asset, Ai,t−1. The price of
the risky asset is determined from the market clearing condition
P
i ∆Ai,t(p) = 0. Since the
demand function in (3) is strictly decreasing, there exists a unique equilibrium price, which
we denote as pt.
In this paper we concentrate on a special case of zero outside supply of the shares of the
risky asset.6 The pricing equation becomes
P
i Ai,t(pt) = 0, which we now rewrite in deviations
5It implies that the WA can be viewed as a limit version of the BA when the number of orders per agent
is inﬁnite.
6Model in Brock and Hommes (1998) is solved under the same assumption. As they show, this assumption
12from fundamental price, xt = pt − pf. Furthermore, we normalize the risk aversion coeﬃcient


















where for h ∈ {1,2} index function Ih
i,t is equal to 1 if agent i forms at time t expectation
Eh
t [pt+1], and it is equal to 0, otherwise.
Pricing equation (9) shows that the market price is a discounted sum of individual ex-
pectations. For instance, if price was on the fundamental level during the last two periods,
both fundamentalists and trend-followers expect no deviation, so that the realized price will
be indeed equal to pf. If, instead, the asset was equally overestimated during the last two pe-
riods (xt−1 = xt−2 > 0), trend-followers will expect no change in price, while fundamentalists
with v < 1 will expect a price correction. As a result, price will move in the direction of the
fundamental level. Its exact value will depend on the relative number of fundamentalists.7
Let us turn now to the question of how the relative number of fundamentalists and trend-
followers is determined. The setting with the WA clearing is also the simplest in this respect.
Indeed, the agents’ demands are always satisﬁed in such a market. Therefore, at any given
period the positions of all the agents with a given forecast are the same, as well as the realized






v xt−2 − Rxt−1
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xt−2 + g (xt−2 − xt−3) − Rxt−1
 
xt − Rxt−1 + δt

, (11)
respectively. Random term δt = yt − ¯ y represents the shock due to the dividend realization.
can be made without lose of generality, since positive supply case is equivalent to a re-deﬁnition of the dividends.
Hommes et al. (2005) consider the model with positive supply.
7Notice that the zero total supply of shares implies that the populations of fundamentalists and trend-
followers always take opposite positions. In the ﬁrst example, both groups have zero amount of shares. In the
second example, fundamentalists are short and trend-followers are long in the risky asset.
133.1 Large Market Limit
An important feature of our setting is that the dynamics under the WA can be studied by
means of the dynamical system theory in a special case, when the number of agents becomes
large. Indeed, for N → ∞ the Law of Large Numbers guarantees a convergence of the actual
fractions of fundamentalists and trend-followers, which can be used in (9) to compute the
price, to the probabilities deﬁned in (8). The model is described then by one equation of the
fourth order (or, equivalently by the 4-dimensional system) consisting of the market clearing
equation coupled with an update of the fractions of fundamentalists (which we will denote
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of fundamentalists (10) and performance measure of trend-followers (11). Dynamics in (12)
is stochastic and there are two sources of noise. First source is the dividend realizations δt
entering the performance measure. Second term, εt+1, was added to the pricing equation to
represent the dynamic noise. When both of these terms are zeros, the corresponding system
is deterministic and the following result takes place.
Proposition 3.1. Consider system (12) with δt = 0, i.e. when yt = ¯ y and with εt = 0. This
system has a unique steady-state with x∗ = 0 and n∗ = e−βC/(1 + e−βC).
(i) For g ≤ R, this steady-state is locally stable.





β = β∗ the steady-state exhibits the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, and for β > β∗ it is
locally unstable.
Proof. From the ﬁrst equation of (12), one gets that in an equilibrium, it is Rx∗ = vx∗ n∗ +
x∗ (1 − n∗). Since v < 1 and the fraction of fundamentalists n∗ should belong to the inter-
val [0,1], this equation has a unique solution x∗ = 0. Substituting zero deviation into the
performance measure, we derive n∗ = e−βC/(1 + e−βC).
14To derive the stability conditions, the Jacobian matrix of the system should be computed.
Substituting the second equation of (12) into the ﬁrst and introducing the lagged variables,
































(v − 1 − g)n∗ + 1 + g

/R g(n∗ − 1)/R 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0



































/R and determinant D = g(1−n∗)/R. Standard conditions for
eigenvalues of this matrix to be insider the unit circle are D < 1, T < D+1 and T > −D−1.
The last two conditions are always satisﬁed, while the ﬁrst is simpliﬁed to n∗ > 1 − R/g.
When g ≤ R, this is also satisﬁed and the fundamental steady-state is locally stable. If
g > R, the bifurcation value is a solution of e−βC/(1+e−βC) = 1−R/g, which gives result of
Proposition 3.1(ii).
The only steady-state of system (12) is “fundamental”, with price staying on the level pf,
implying deviation x∗ = 0. In this situation both forecasting rules give correct predictions, but
fundamentalists have to pay positive cost C. Consequently, they have smaller relative share
than the trend-followers: n∗ < 0.5. With growing β, the equilibrium fraction of trend-followers
increases. When the trend-followers extrapolate weakly (0 < g < 1 + r), the fundamental
steady state is stable. When they extrapolate strongly (g > 1 + r), the fundamental steady-
state is stable for small β and unstable for high β. When β crosses its critical value, the
stable quasi-cyclic attractor is created through the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Notice that
the bifurcation value of β does not depend on the value of parameter v in the fundamentalists’
forecasting rule.
Qualitatively, Proposition 3.1 implies that depending on the intensity of choice market
dynamics can be in one of two regimes: tranquil, with price staying on the fundamental level,
and volatile, with systematic large deviations from it. In the ﬁrst regime there is no excess
15Figure 1: Bifurcation diagrams for the Walrasian model in the limit N → ∞. For each
β ∈ (0,12), 300 points after 10000 transitory periods are shown. Left panel: Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation of fundamental steady-state. Parameters are: r = 0.1, ¯ y = 10, v = 0.1, g = 1.2 and
C = 1. Right panel: Phase portrait of the system in coordinates (pt,pt−1). Quasi-periodic
cycle coexists with fundamental steady-state. The same parameters as in the left panel with
β = 2.3.
volatility in price and the trading volume is zero. In the second regime periods of overvaluation
of the asset are followed by the periods of its undervaluation, and price exhibits bubbles and
crashes with positive trading volume and excess volatility. Coexistence of two regimes and
its dependence from simple behavioral parameter, makes the case of strong extrapolation
especially interesting.8 Benchmark parameters r = 0.1 and g = 1.2 of our simulation are
chosen to guarantee the coexistence of two regimes, since we are interested in the dependence
of “bifurcation scenario” on the market architecture. Other parameters are set to ¯ y = 10,
implying fundamental price pf = 100, and C = 1. The precise values of both of them are not
important for qualitative behavior. Finally, we choose v = 0.1, implying that fundamentalists
expect very small deviation from fundamental value. Again, the precise value of v is not
important. However, as our simulations show, parameter v must be small enough in order the
price dynamics to be bounded.
8Similar regimes were identiﬁed in simulations of Santa Fe artiﬁcial market model of Arthur et al. (1997),
and analytical treatment in Brock and Hommes (1998).
16The results of Proposition 3.1 are illustrated for these benchmark parameters in Fig. 1.
The left panel shows a bifurcation diagram, where for each β ∈ (0,12) we simulate the long-run
behavior of price. In accordance with our result for any β < β∗ ≈ 2.398 the price converges
to the fundamental price p∗. When the intensity of choice increases to β∗ the fundamental
equilibrium loses stability, and a stable quasi-periodic cycle around p∗ is created. In the
volatile regime, the price dynamics is ﬂuctuating around p∗. The bifurcation diagram shows
that the amplitude of these ﬂuctuations slightly increases with the intensity of choice.
An interesting feature of the model is not captured by the bifurcation diagram and Propo-
sition 3.1. The right panel of Fig. 1 illustrates that a stable quasi-periodic cycle exists in the
model even for β = 2.3 which is less than β∗. Numerical analysis of the system shows that the
fundamental steady state is globally stable for β < β∗∗ = 2.23. Then, when the intensity of
choice belongs to the interval [β∗∗,β∗], locally stable fundamental steady-state coexists with
a quasi-periodic attractor.9
Typical patterns of price and return dynamics for the volatile regime of the model (β = 5
in this example) are shown in Fig. 2. The deterministic simulation in the left panel shows that
in such regime, characterized by persistent deviations from the fundamental level, dynamics
repeatedly go through qualitatively similar phases. At the beginning of each phase price ﬂuc-
tuates only slightly around fundamental value. With time, however, ﬂuctuations are getting
wilder, but at a certain point the price stabilizes and exhibits only small oscillations. The
right panel shows the dynamics of the same model when both noise terms, random dividend
and dynamic noise, are added.
To get insight into economic explanation of the endogenous ﬂuctuations, in Fig. 3 we
show a snapshot of the previous deterministic simulation for 23 periods. Dynamics of the
prices (top panel), of the fraction of fundamentalists (middle, in the log scale) and of the
excess return xt − Rxt−1 (bottom) are shown. When price is close to the fundamental level
both fundamentalists and trend followers have similar return, but the former group pays a
9Such coexistence of attractors seems to be a consequence of a so-called Chenciner bifurcation, thoroughly































































Figure 2: Price (left axis) and return (right axis) dynamics in the limit of Walrasian model.
The same parameters as in the left panel of Fig. 1 and β = 5. Left panel: Deterministic
dynamics. Right panel: Dynamics with random dividend and small dynamic noise. Both








































Figure 3: Dynamics in the limit of Walrasian model for the benchmarking values of parameters
and β = 5.
positive cost. The trend-followers then dominate the market and an upward price trend is
developed. Trend-followers hold the asset and fundamentalists sell short waiting for the price
correction. However, the short-term return of the asset is positive (due to the capital gain)
and the wealth of trend-followers increases. Between periods 76 and 79 their share grows.
This process ends because, on the one hand, the extrapolative expectations are not strong
18enough to sustain a trend, and, on the other hand, the asset is overvalued and the dividend
yield is low. As the fraction of fundamentalists grows, the price trend slows down, the excess
return becomes negative, and at period 81 trend is reverting. Self-fulﬁlling downward trend is
now developed and the fraction of the trend-followers increases again. However, as before, the
price extrapolation is not enough, and at period 91 the excess return becomes positive with
prices still below the fundamentals. It brings a high return to the fundamentalists who holds
the asset. This return overcomes positive costs, and the fraction of fundamentalists grows
almost to 1. It brings price to the fundamental level and story repeats itself.
To summarize, the special case of the Walrasian market with a large number of agents shows
that the model has a unique, fundamental steady-state. If the trend-followers extrapolate
strongly enough, this steady-state loses its stability when the intensity of choice increases.
Consequently, two diﬀerent regimes are observed, tranquil and volatile. The second regime,
when the intensity of choice is high, is consistent with excess volatility. Will these two regimes
present in a market with alternative trading mechanism? How the critical value of intensity
of choice depend on the market trading rules? And how the properties of price dynamics are
aﬀected by the mechanisms? These are the questions which we analyze below.
4 Market Mechanisms
A market mechanism is a well-deﬁned procedure which transforms input from agents to the
output as price and quantity traded. There are numerous market mechanisms in a litera-
ture and reality, among which we take three stylized procedures. The model was simulated
separately for every mechanism and the results were compared.
4.1 Walrasian Auction
The implementation of Walrasian auction (WA) was described in the beginning of the previous
Section. Dynamics is given by the pricing equation (9), while the forecasting type of any trader
is determined by probabilities (8). Recall that the demand of agents are always satisﬁed
19under the WA implying that the performance measures are given by (10) and (11). The only
diﬀerence between the Large Market Limit analyzed in Section 3.1 and the WA simulations
reported below is the number of agents, which is inﬁnite in the former case and ﬁnite in the
latter.
Simple but informative illustration of the WA is given in the left panel of Fig. 4. In this
example there are ﬁve fundamentalists and ﬁve trend-followers arriving to the market at time
t with initial endowments of zero shares of the risky asset (i.e. demand and excess demand
coincide for these agents). Let us assume that pt−2 < pt−1 = pf. Since fundamentalists forecast
price pf for the next period, they have net demand for pt < pf and net supply, otherwise. The
thin curves show individual demand (supply) schedules of fundamentalists. Trend-followers
expect that prices will be raising, so that they have net demand for pt < p∗ and net supply
for pt > p∗ with some p∗ > pf. The dashed lines show individual demand (supply) schedules
for trend-followers. All individual demand and supply have the same slope, R, in absolute
value. To obtain the aggregate curves one has to sum up individual schedules for every given
price, i.e. horizontally. When price is inside the interval [pf,p∗] all the demand is generated
by the trend-followers and all the supply is generated by the fundamentalists. Summation of
ﬁve corresponding curves gives the aggregate demand and aggregate supply both shown as
thick curves. When price is below pf, all ten agents want to buy. Thus, the aggregate supply
is zero, while the aggregate demand curve has a kink at price pf. Analogously, the aggregate
demand is zero above p∗ and the aggregate supply curve has a kink at price p∗.
The aggregate demand and the aggregate supply curves intersect in the point labeled
“WA”, whose ordinate is the equilibrium price and abscissa is the equilibrium quantity under
Walrasian market-clearing. All the agents trade their respective quantity on the equilibrium
price. Notice that in this example, the equilibrium price is on the half way between pf and p∗,
which are “no-trade” prices for the two forecasting types. Other distribution of agents among
types would lead to diﬀerent outcome. It is geometrically clear from Fig. 4 that when agents
with one forecasting type are outnumbered by the agents of another type, then equilibrium



































Figure 4: Comparison of diﬀerent market-clearing mechanisms. Left panel: Walrasian price
and quantity are found as intersections of the aggregate demand and supply schedules (thick)
built starting from the individual curves. Right panel: Batch auction compared with Wal-
rasian auction.
smaller than under equal type distribution.
4.2 Batch Auction
Under the batch auction (BA) agent i submits at time t one limit order, which is a price/quantity
combination (pi,t,qi,t). When the ordered quantity is positive (negative), the order is of a buy
(sell) type. The price in the limit order deﬁnes the largest (smallest) price accepted to the
submitter for execution of the buy (sell) order.
To make a comparison between the BA and the WA meaningful, we will require that agents
submit those price/quantity combinations, which belong to their demand or supply schedules.
We use simple strategic considerations to determine the price in the order generation process.
Namely, we assume that the price of the limit order pi,t of agent i is determined as a random
draw from a normal distribution with mean pt−1, the price of the previous trading session,
and standard deviation σo. The realizations are independent over time and agents. Under
this price selection rule an agent reasonably believes that there is a high chance that her order
will be executed at a price which is close to the last closing price pt−1. The larger is the
deviation from this price, the higher may be potential gains from the trade, but the lower
21is the likelihood of such an order execution. Therefore, only in rare occasions an agent will
experiment with an order priced considerably far from the previous closing price pt−1
10.
Given price pi,t, the desired quantity is computed as
qi,t(pi,t) = Ai,t(pi,t) − Ai,t−1 , (13)
where the ﬁrst term in the right hand-side is a point from the demand curve (3), while Ai,t−1
is a current holding of the risky asset.
All N orders are submitted simultaneously. Then, all the limit buy orders are sorted
such that their price sequence is decreasing. It gives us a step-level market demand curve.
Analogously, the limit sell orders are sorted so that their price is increasing to deﬁne a step-
level market supply curve. The price pt is determined as an intersection of constructed demand
and supply curves (or the midpoint of the interval between the lowest and the highest clearing
price, if there are multiple intersections). In those cases when demand and supply curves do
not intersect, price pt is set to the price of previous period, pt−1. The corresponding quantities
are traded on this price between those agents who submitted bids (asks) no lower (no higher)
than pt. Traders who submitted orders exactly at pt may be rationed accordingly, while all
the other traders do not trade at all and keep their previous portfolios.
In the right panel of Fig. 4 we use the previous example to construct the schedules for the
BA. For every agent one price was generated randomly around price pt−1 = pf and then the
corresponding individual demanded or supplied quantity was found. Sum of the quantities gave
two step curves whose intersection, labeled “BA”, determines equilibrium price and quantity.
Of course, the precise schedules depend on the particular random draw, but certain general
tendency can be seen from this example. Obviously, the quantity traded under BA is always
smaller than the quantity traded under WA, while the equilibrium price under the BA can be
both higher or smaller than under the WA.
In computation of time-t performance measures, notice that a number of traders did not
trade during time t − 1, so that their positions were left unchanged. Thus, their perfor-
10In the context of the OB, Farmer and Mike (2008) ﬁnd that the shape of the actual distribution of prices
of submitted orders can be well approximated by Student t distribution around the best price
22mances are evaluated as Ai,t−2
 
pt + yt − (1 + r)pt−1

, which is an earned excess proﬁt on
the old holdings. Instead, those traders who did trade (and were not rationed) changed





, and it is diﬀerent from the performance under WA be-
cause the transactions happened not on the submitted price of bid, pi,t−1. The BA mechanism,
by its nature, introduces distortions in the individual agents performances.
4.3 Order Book
In the order-book market, there are many transactions during one trading session at time t.
Each agent can place only one buy or one sell order during the session. To make a reasonable
comparison with the BA, the order generation process is identical to the one described in
Section 4.2, while the sequence in which agents place their orders is determined randomly and
independent for diﬀerent sessions.
During the session the market operates according to the following mechanism. There is
an electronic book containing unsatisﬁed agents’ buy and sell orders placed during current
trading session. When a new buy or sell order arrives to the market, it is checked against the
counter-side of the book. The order is partially or completely executed if it ﬁnds a match,
i.e. a counter-side order at requested or better price, starting from the best available price.
An unsatisﬁed order or its part is placed in the book. At the end of the session all unsatisﬁed
orders are removed from the book. The mechanisms for determining type of the order, its
price and quantity are equivalent to those described for the batch auction. Price pt is the
closing price of the session, i.e. the price of the last transaction.
In Fig. 5 we show a possible order book realization for the same limit orders as were
generated for the BA illustration in Fig. 4. The integer labels show the sequence in which the
buy/sell orders arrive, while diﬀerent types of horizontal lines show which part of the order is
satisﬁed. Order 2 partially matches order 1 and after the corresponding transaction one sell
order (part of order 2) remains in the book. Then buy order 3 arrives, but its price is worse




















Figure 5: Order-book market compared with BA.
4 is added to the sell part of the book, and order 5 is added to the buy side of the book.
Moreover, this order has the best price to buy at this moment. When order 6 arrives, ﬁrst
it partially matches with order 5, and then its remaining part matches with order 3. Point
OB shows the outcome of the trade with the OB mechanism. The price pt is the price of
order 3, while the volume for the session is the total traded number of shares. Notice that
the ﬂexibility of this trading mechanism allows larger traded volume than under the BA. At
the same time, the OB price pt is typically diﬀerent from the BA price and may signiﬁcantly
depend on the order in which transactions happen.
Agents’ performance measure is computed as in (6), but similarly to the BA mechanism
the agents’ position Ai,t−2 may be diﬀerent from the agents’ demand Ai,t−2(pt−2). Contrary
to the BA case, however, the order in which agents arrive to the market is now important for
the outcome of trade, that is whether an agent is rationed or not.
5 Simulations and Results
We simulate the system with ﬁnite number of agents under diﬀerent market mechanisms,
namely the WA, the BA and the OB mechanism 11. In all cases we keep the dividend constant
11The software for the simulation is written in C++ and is a modiﬁcation of the YAFiMM package created
for Bottazzi et al. (2005). The YAFiMM package is publicly available at http://www.sssup.it/∼bottazzi
24Parameter Symbol Value (Range)
Intensity of choice β [0,12]
Interest rate r 0.1
Mean dividend ¯ y 10
Normalized risk-aversion aσ2 1.0
Trend-followers’ extrapolation g 1.2
Fundamentalists’ reversion v 0.1
Fundamentalists’ costs C 1.0
Stand. deviation of limit order price σo 3.0
Number of agents N 1000
Transient period Tr 2000
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations.
and do not add any dynamic noise. While under these two assumptions in the LML with
Walrasian market clearing the system is deterministic, in the simulations with a ﬁnite number
of agents the amount of randomness will increase from one mechanism to another. With
the WA the system becomes stochastic since the realized fractions of fundamentalist and
trend-followers are no longer equal to their analytic probabilities. In the BA the amount of
stochasticity is higher due to the fact that agents choose a random points on their individual
demand schedules. In the OB mechanism the level of stochasticity is further increased by
random sequencing of order submissions.
The parameters that we use for the simulations are summarized in Table 1. The model
parameters are the same as we used in the analysis of the LML, when non-trivial and non-
divergent dynamics was generated. The behavioral parameter we mainly focus on is the
intensity of choice β. In all our simulations we set the number of agents N = 1000. This
number is high enough to obtain a dynamics close to the deterministic LML with WA. The
transient period is set to 2000 to avoid any transitory eﬀects.




















































































Figure 6: Dynamics of prices (left axis) and share of fundamentalists (right axis in the log-
scale) for β = 5 in WA, BA, OB and LML with model approximation error. In the latter
case the error is independently drawn from normal distribution with zero mean and standard
deviation σε = 0.3.
simulated from the model under diﬀerent market mechanisms. In Fig. 6 we show the dynamics
of the price (upper part, left axis) and the share of fundamentalists (lower part, right axis)
for β = 5. Recall from Figs. 2 and 3 that for this level of the intensity of choice, the system
in the LML does not converge to the fundamental steady-state, but oscillates around it. The
top panel shows that under the WA the system behaves similarly to the deterministic LML
buﬀeted with small dynamic noise (cf. the right panel of Fig. 2). Under the BA (the second
panel from the top) and the OB (the third panel from the top) the dynamics is similar but
certain diﬀerences can be observed even by the naked eye.
First, the price deviations from the fundamental level have larger amplitude than under
the WA. Second, looking at the dynamics of the fraction of the fundamentalists in all three
markets, one can distinguish the two alternating phases in the dynamics, but these phases are
much more visible under the order-driven protocols than under the Walrasian market. These
phases are (1) stable ecology, when the fractions of fundamentalists/trend-followers in the
26market exhibit only moderate changes and (2) turbulent ecology, when every period a large
fraction of agents switch from one type to another. Third, under the OB this populational
dynamics translates into price dynamics and the observed phases of stable and turbulent
ecology correspond to the phases of small and large price oscillations, respectively. These
phases can be linked to the phenomenon of volatility clustering observed in the real ﬁnancial
data. Under the BA the changes between small and large price ﬂuctuations are not so abrupt.
Finally, we want to verify whether similar price behavior can be obtained by adding a
dynamic noise to the LML.12 In the bottom panel we add the Gaussian noise to the LML
dynamics given by the system (12). The standard deviation 0.3 is chosen to match the am-
plitude of the price ﬂuctuations under the order-driven mechanisms. Contrary to the last two
mechanisms, we no longer observe clear-cut phases in the time series. Therefore, the random-
ness inherent to the order-driven market mechanisms distorts the price evolution diﬀerently
from simple dynamic noise.
5.1 Change of Market Regimes
Next, we investigate the interplay of agents behavior and market mechanism on price dynamics
in details.
Fig. 7 depicts the dependence of the stable distribution of prices on the intensity of choice
parameter β. The parameter β ranges from 0 to 12 with a linear step of 0.05 which gives
240 points in total. The distribution for each level of beta is represented by a gray-shade
coded histogram. Darker shades correspond to the areas of higher density. The histogram is
computed using price levels from 10000 periods after 2000 transient periods. A bifurcation in
the stochastic system corresponds to the qualitative changes in the stable distribution which
we attempt to identify graphically. In the case of the WA around the point β = 2.23, we
observe a dramatic increase in the variance of the distribution and an emergence of bimodal
distribution. Around this point of bifurcation the system transits from the tranquil regime to
12For instance, Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007) try to reproduce the “stylized facts” by adding the
dynamic noise to a similar deterministic model.
27Figure 7: Distribution of prices for diﬀerent market mechanisms as a function of the intensity
of choice. A critical value of β (or range of the values) for which the change of market regime
happens is smaller for WA and larger for BA.
the volatile regime discussed in details in Section 3.1. The bifurcation is delayed for the BA
and occurs around β = 4. For the OB mechanism the bifurcation occurs for the value of β
higher then for the WA and lower then for the BA, around the point β = 3. For additional
evidence about the point of bifurcation under three diﬀerent mechanisms see Fig. 8 (left panel)
which shows standard deviation of the price.
The delay in bifurcation observed for order-driven mechanisms can be explained by the
interplay between agents behavior and the characteristics of the mechanism. As we pointed
out in Section 2.2, the intensity of choice parameter β is inversely proportional to the level of
noise in the average performance of the forecasting rule (see Eq. 7). Thus, the higher level of
noise in the performance measure would correspond to the lower level of β. Recall also that
the performance measure is the average of individual performances taken over all the agents
using the same forecasting rule, and that the individual performances are computed on the
28basis of the agents’ holdings of the risky asset and the excess return of this asset as in 6. When
describing trading mechanisms in Section 4 we emphasized that the agents’ (excess) demands
are fully satisﬁed only under the WA. Under the BA and the OB mechanisms the agents’
demands are translated into orders, some of which may be rationed. Risky asset holdings of
the agents whose orders were rationed may be inconsistent with the chosen predictor resulting
in an inconsistent performance measure. This in turn will result in a higher level of noise in the
average performance measure of the strategy lowering the “eﬀective” value of the intensity of
choice parameter β. The larger is the amount of rationed orders, the higher is the level of noise.
Note that the amount of rationed orders is larger under the BA than under the OB (see Fig. 5).
It suggests that the actual “bifurcation” level of β is higher under the BA mechanism than
under the OB mechanism, which is exactly what we observe in Fig. 7. Additional evidence of
the amount of rationed orders under the order-driven mechanisms is provided in Fig. 8 (right
panel) where we report an average traded volume of the risky asset.
Thus, in the Adaptive Belief Scheme, where heterogeneous agents choose their active fore-
casting rules on the basis of past performances, the order rationing ineﬃciencies introduced
by the order-driven mechanisms, lead to market stabilization in a sense of wider interval of the
intensity of choice parameter β for which the market is in the tranquil regime. It is, however,
important to keep in mind that in the volatile regime, when the intensity of choice is high
enough, the market ﬂuctuations are larger in amplitude under the order-driven markets (see
Figs. 6 and 7).
5.2 Informational Eﬃciency
The Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis postulates that in the eﬃcient market the price should reﬂect
all available information about the asset value. In our setting with random i.i.d. dividend,
the fundamental value of the asset is simply discounted sum of all future expected dividends,
i.e. fundamental price pf. The informational eﬃciency is often measured by comparing the
volatility of the observed price with the volatility of the fundamental dividend process (see





























































Figure 8: Two measures of market information in-eﬃciency for diﬀerent market mechanisms
as a function of the intensity of choice β. Left panel: Standard deviation of price. Right
panel: Traded volume.
the dividend process constant. Under this assumption the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis would
predict constant price over time and zero trading volume. Therefore, price volatility and
trading volume can be used as measures of information eﬃciency.
In Fig. 8 we compare the standard deviation of the price (left panel) and the average traded
volume (right panel) under diﬀerent values of β for three market mechanisms and the LML
with the Gaussian noise (σε = 0.3). As before, the intensity of choice parameter β varies from
0 to 12 with a linear step of 0.05 which gives 240 points of evaluation in total. As usually, we
ignore the ﬁrst 2000 transitory steps and compute the standard deviation of the price and the
average traded volume over the next 1000 periods. To eliminate the dependence of our results
on a particular realization of random seed, we repeat this process for 100 random seeds and
report an average of the statistics of interest. Averaging over diﬀerent random seeds accounts
for possible dependence of our results on initial conditions. We also compute 95% conﬁdence
bounds for the reported averages. Given the length of the series and the large number of
random seeds the conﬁdence bounds are very tights. For clarity, we do not plot them on the
ﬁgures, but they can be easily inferred from statistics variations for neighboring values of β.
The standard deviation of the price (Fig. 8, left panel) depends on both the intensity of
choice parameter β and the market mechanism. For β < 2 all of the mechanisms without added
30dynamic noise have standard deviation close to zero. It rises rapidly at the point of bifurcation
and quickly converges to the level around 1.0 for WA, while for the BA and OR is continues to
grow with β and shows some signs of stabilization to the level of 4.0 and 4.5 respectively when
β > 11. The standard deviation for the OB is always higher then for the BA because of earlier
bifurcation and extra layer of stochasticity (order sequencing) speciﬁc for the OB mechanism.
The dynamic noise added to the LML is magniﬁed from the initial level of σε = 0.3 to the
level increasing from 0.5 to 2.0 and stabilizing at the level of 2.0 when β > 4. The observed
volatility pattern for the LML with the dynamic noise is diﬀerent from the pattern produced by
the order-driven mechanisms, which conﬁrms that the time-series produced under the latter
could not be produced by adding dynamic noise to the analytic LML. Based on volatility
measure we conclude that information eﬃciency depends on both behavioral and institutional
assumptions. For β > 5 the WA provided the most informationally eﬃcient outcome, followed
by the BA while the OB give the least informationally eﬃcient outcome. However, when
2 < β < 5 the order-driven mechanism are superior to the WA.
The average traded volume (Fig. 8, right panel) also depends on the value of β. For
β < 2, when the price is very close to the fundamental, the average traded volume is 0 for
all mechanisms besides LML with the dynamic noise. The dynamic noise added to the LML
creates very high level of volume which slowly levels oﬀ with β increasing, which as before is
in sharp contrast with the patterns produced by the order-driven mechanisms. For β > 2.3
the traded volume is always higher for the WA, which is followed by the OB and the BA.
The reason for lower volume is the order rationing which is higher for the BA than for the
OB (see Fig. 5). Interestingly, the average traded volume decreases in β, for β > 5. For large
values of β the fraction one type of agents is much larger than the fraction of the other type,
which leads to the lower volume as explained in details in Section 4.1.
In this Section we showed that in the volatile regime, i.e. when the intensity of choice is
large enough, the order-driven markets are less informationally eﬃcient from the point of view
of price volatility, but more eﬃcient in the sense that they lead to smaller trading volume.
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Figure 9: Allocative eﬃciency loss for diﬀerent market mechanisms as a function of the inten-
sity of choice β.
example, smaller traded volume in a market with rich endogenous dynamics can be a sign of
lesser eﬃciency. Finally, notice that in their model of heterogeneous agents with ﬁxed fractions
Bottazzi et al. (2005) ﬁnd similar results.
5.3 Allocative Eﬃciency
The main purpose of any trading mechanism is an eﬃcient allocation of resources, that is an
allocation which fully satisﬁes agents’ demands at a realized price. By construction the WA
always achieves an eﬃcient allocation. For more realistic trading mechanism such as the BA
and the OB, an eﬃcient allocation is not necessarily guaranteed. Following Bottazzi et al.
(2005) we deﬁne a measure of allocative eﬃciency loss, Li,t:
Li,t = 1 −
1
1 + |Ai,t(pt) − Ai,t|pt
, (14)
where Ai,t(pt) is a desired amount of risky asset, i.e. a point on the demand schedule of agent
i at closing price pt of the period, and Ai,t is the realized holding of the risky asset of agent
i at the end of period t. By construction the measure is always between 0 and 1. Obviously
under the WA the (excess) demands of the agents are fully satisﬁed and Li,t = 0.
Fig. 9 shows the measure of allocative eﬃciency loss averaged across 1000 agents as a
function of the intensity of choice β for the BA and the OB mechanisms. As before we take
32an average over 1000 time periods after the 2000 transitory periods which is averaged again
over 100 random seeds. Consistently with our previous result we observe that the allocative
eﬃciency loss depends on β. Before the bifurcation point the ineﬃciency is lower since we are
close the the fundamental price and agents’ demands are relatively small. After the bifurcation
the price amplitude increases which translates into larger demands and the allocative eﬃciency
loss increases. For β > 5 the allocative eﬃciency loss stabilizes at the level close to 0.85 for
both order-driven mechanism and then slowly levels oﬀ. This small increase in eﬃciency
is again explained by the higher concentration of price distribution in the neighborhood of
fundamental price for larger values of the intensity of choice.
The allocative eﬃciency of the two order-driven mechanisms is exactly the same for a
given β > 5. While the eﬀect of the order rationing is more pronounced under the BA, the
OB produces higher price deviations. Apparently both eﬀects are of the same magnitude in
terms of an inﬂuence on the allocative eﬃciency loss. Similarly to Bottazzi et al. (2005), in
our model the precise implementation of the clearing system on the order-driven market does
not aﬀect the allocative eﬃciency.
5.4 Time Series Properties
We compare the times series of the price returns generated under diﬀerent market mechanisms
through the prism of “stylized facts” established in the literature that was shortly discussed
in the Introduction. The returns are deﬁned as rt = (pt − pt−1)/pt−1, i.e. as relative price
changes. All the statistics were computed over 1000 periods after 2000 transient and averaged
over 100 random seeds.
The returns averages over time are close to zero for all three mechanisms and for all
considered values of β. Similarly, the skewness of return, which measures the asymmetry of
the distribution is close to zero for all mechanisms and all β. Both these statistics are in
agreement with real data. In discussing other statistics, notice that in the tranquil regime
under the WA, the price dynamics converge to the fundamental level, so that the higher order
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Figure 10: Time-series properties as a function of the intensity of choice β. Left panel:
Excess kurtosis of the return distribution. Right panel: Autocorrelation of returns.
Comparison of the empirical return distributions with the normal distribution reveals that
in the real markets returns exhibit a higher concentration around the mean and also the fatter
tails. These properties of the distribution can be measured by excess kurtosis with respect to
the kurtosis of the normal distribution, which is equal to 3. We ﬁnd that the (excess) kurtosis
of returns (see the left panel of Fig. 10) depends both on the value of the intensity of choice
and on the market clearing mechanism. With increase of β, when it reaches the critical value
of the market regime change, the kurtosis drops sharply, then it grows monotonically and then
levels oﬀ converging to the relatively stable level. Close to the point of the regime change,
the kurtosis is the highest under the BA and the lowest under the WA. For higher values of
the intensity of choice, under all three mechanisms the kurtosis converges to the value similar
to the one observed for the S&P 500 Index, which is 8.5 according to Gaunersdorfer and
Hommes (2007). The dependence of kurtosis on behavioral parameters is in sharp contrast to
the conclusions of Bottazzi et al. (2005) who ﬁnd that skewness and kurtosis values depend
only on market mechanism.
Linear unpredictability of the stock returns is another well-established regularity. It is
usually veriﬁed by computing the autocorrelations of returns, which die out fast for the real
data being insigniﬁcant already on the ﬁrst lag. In the right panel of Fig. 10, we show
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Figure 11: Autocorrelations of squared returns. Left panel: Autocorrelations for lags 1 − 5
(top to bottom) as a function of the intensity of choice β and Right panel: Autocorrelation
function for lags 1 − 20 for ﬁxed β = 8.0.
for all three mechanisms. In all cases we observe relatively large autocorrelations for the
lags 1 − 3 which is in contrast to the stylized facts. Relatively large autocorrelations of the
returns produced by the model are the consequence of our behavioral assumptions, and, in
particular, of the dominating trend-following behavior. Even if the modeling of a more realistic
market architecture cannot “kill” the autocorrelations completely, it contributes to a certain
improvement in the statistics. Indeed, conditional that the market is in the volatile regime, the
autocorrelations are the largest under the WA.13 Bottazzi et al. (2005) do not ﬁnd conclusive
evidence about the sign and magnitude of the autocorrelations of returns produced by their
model, but indicate that they also signiﬁcant on the ﬁrst few lags.
Finally, we turn to the volatility clustering universally observed in the data. Volatility
clustering, which suggests that despite the linear unpredictability of returns, they are not
independent, can be identiﬁed as a presence of signiﬁcant autocorrelations in the squared
returns for a number of lags. In the left panel of Fig. 11 we show the autocorrelations of squared
returns for lags 1−5 (top to bottom) as a function of β. One immediately observes not only an
13The returns autocorrelations can be lowered to the zero level by adding a suﬃciently large amount of
dynamic noise, see e.g. Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007). Since it comes in a cost of understanding the
dynamics of the model, we do not follow this tempting path.
35expected dependence on the intensity of choice parameter β, but also a signiﬁcant dependence
on the market architecture. Namely, under both order-driven protocols the autocorrelations
of the squared returns are always positive and relatively large. They decay slowly, which is
consistent with the volatility clustering. In turn for the WA the autocorrelations of squared
returns are generally close to zero or even negative.
To verify whether the squared returns generated by our model exhibit long memory, in
the right panel of Fig. 11 we plot the autocorrelation function for the ﬁxed value of β = 8 for
three diﬀerent mechanisms. The thin lines indicate 0.95 conﬁdence limits. For the BA and
the OB the squared returns show positive slow decaying correlation, while under the WA the
auto-correlations are small and their pattern is atypical for ﬁnancial series. We conclude that
in our model the realistic patterns of volatility clustering can be attributed to the realistic
order-driven mechanisms. Similarly Bottazzi et al. (2005) ﬁnd volatility clustering and long
memory of squared returns under the BA and the OB mechanisms.
6 Conclusion
Simulations presented in this paper contribute to the analysis of the interplay between be-
havioral ecologies of markets with heterogeneous traders and institutional market settings.
We motivated our work by a presence of many regularities observed in ﬁnancial markets and
diﬀerent approaches which economists exploit for explanation of them. However, since the
dynamics of ﬁnancial market is an outcome of a complicated interrelation between behavioral
patterns and underlying market mechanism, we oﬀer a route in between, starting with simple,
analytically tractable model based on ﬂexible behavioral assumptions and simulating it for a
more realistic market setting.
Our gradual approach of introducing diﬀerent market mechanisms in the market with
heterogeneous agents was inspired by the work of Bottazzi et al. (2005). As opposed to our
set-up, in their model agents did not change their strategies over time. As a result, Bottazzi
et al. (2005) suggest that the time series properties are largely driven by market architecture.
36We, however, clearly see that certain behavioral features are also important. In our model, no
matter which type of market clearing is used, two diﬀerent regimes with completely diﬀerent
dynamical properties occur depending on the value of the intensity of choice. On the other
hand, trading protocol strongly aﬀects the critical value of the intensity of choice, playing
the role of the border line between two regimes. Furthermore, provided that the market is in
volatile regime, the trading protocol also dictates the time series property.
We have also investigated an allocative eﬃciency of the market. The seminal paper of Gode
and Sunder (1993) suggests that the continuous double auction leads to an allocatively eﬃcient
outcome even when agents trade at random. LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2007) explore this line
of research and compare performances of four market protocols in terms of diﬀerent criteria
such as the time needed to converge to the equilibrium, traded volume and price volatility
generated during this convergence. Agents valuations, or so called environment, is ﬁxed in
both paper. We consider a dynamic model with ever-changing environment, and ﬁnd in this
setting that there is simply not enough time to converge to an allocative eﬃciency outcome
under the order- driven mechanisms. We ﬁnd that the allocative eﬃciency loss is comparable
for both mechanisms.
For better understanding of causal eﬀects we keep our current model as parsimonious as
possible. There is a number of extentions to the model that we consider in the future research.
First, we plan to investigate the role of market orders in the order-driven protocols. Then
we wish to increase the level of strategic behaviour in selecting the price level for the limit
orders and also in choosing between the market order and the limit order. In terms of the
market setup, we would like to consider the situation when the dividends are paid not every
period, but only after a certain number of periods. It would also be interesting to consider
an exogenous news arrival process. On the behavioural side, we would to extend the number
of trading rules, and allow our trend-followers to learn the coeﬀcient of extrapolation and
fundametalists to learn the coeﬃcient of reversion.
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